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Law and Oppression: A Moral Call to Abstain from the Use of Moral Language 
Benjamin L. Stalnaker 
In our increasingly polarized political climate, moral rhetoric is a tool 
being deftly wielded to advance controversial positions, target disfavored 
groups, and alienate political opponents. Moral language can, and often is, 
effective in achieving the goal of the speaker, despite the falsity of the 
statements themselves. By moral language or moral rhetoric, it is meant simple 
moral language containing generic moral terms and no further justification. 
Such terms include good, bad, right, wrong, moral, immoral, just, unjust, 
should, ought, etc. Use of these terms is not restricted to those who use them 
accurately or even well-intentioned. Examples of that sort of use of moral 
language includes Georgia Republican Representative Tom Price’s comments 
on the Affordable Care Act, “This bill is an affront on the morality of the 
provision of American healthcare […] We lose our morality and our freedom”1 
North Carolina Republican Senator David Curtis implicitly invokes moral 
language when criticizing Charlotte’s LGBT protection ordinance, “This liberal 
group is trying to redefine everything about our society. Gender and marriage 
— just the whole liberal agenda. I don’t think we should let national criticism 
stop us from doing what we should do.”2 Finally, moral rhetoric is constantly 
                                                          
1 “AAPS Member Rep. Tom Price, MD’s Floor Remarks on Government Takeover of Health 
Care,” last modified on November 7, 2009, http://aapsonline.org/aaps-member-rep-tom-price-
mds-floor-remarks-on-government-takeover-of-health-care/.    
2 Agrawal, Nadya. “North Carolina Republicans Vow Showdown Over Trans Rights.” The 
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/charlotte-passes-bathroom-bill-to-
protect-trans-people-and-conservatives-arent-happy_us_56cdd1e8e4b0928f5a6de60c (accessed 
March 3, 2017).  
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used to criticize same sex marriage or other issues related to gay rights. These 
examples demonstrate that moral norms are often utilized by actors that are 
advancing ends antithetical to morality. The misuse of moral language provides 
compelling moral reasons for all individuals to abstain from the use of moral 
language when discussing laws. While the examples cited above adhere to a 
particular set of moral beliefs, the position of this paper still holds regardless of 
the content of morality. This piece will begin by demonstrating that the misuse 
of moral language is a problem worth addressing. Next, it will answer an 
intuitive objection before proving why the position of this paper is an actual 
solution to the problem. Finally, a serious objection will be responded to.  
The misuse of moral language when discussing laws and policies allows 
for the passing of immoral laws and harm to befall vulnerable groups. The use 
of moral rhetoric serves a very particular function in the context of law and 
politics, namely associating specific public policies with constituents’ 
preexisting moral commitments.3 Regardless of whether or not the policy 
actually aligns with morality, the invocation of the language provides 
constituents with additional reasons to approve or disapprove of the policy 
depending on the context in which the language is used. Since moral rhetoric 
has the potential to garner public support for a law regardless of the 
truthfulness of the statements, such language can be used to pass immoral or 
amoral laws and policies. Given that immoral laws, especially those passed at 
                                                          
3 Clifford, Scott, and Jennifer Jerit. “How Words Do the Work of Politics: Moral Foundations 
Theory and the Debate over Stem Cell Research.” The Journal of Politics 75.3 (2013): 660.  
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the federal level, have the potential to harm millions of people, there is a 
compelling reason to attempt to prevent the instrumentalization of moral 
language for immoral ends.  
An alternative and equally worrisome use of moral language is the impact 
it has on specific groups. Specifically, what poses a threat is its ability “to 
define the limits of moral communities, to define ingroups versus outgroups.”4 
It is common to understandings of morality that different groups warrant 
different treatment. Criminals, for example, are not thought to deserve all the 
same rights and freedoms as law-abiding individuals. Additionally, there are 
also thought to be special moral duties to ones’ friends, family, compatriots, 
etc. Since rights and privileges are linked to one’s membership of a morally 
relevant group, moral language has the potential to strip away those rights and 
deny access to those privileges by categorizing people as outside of the morally 
relevant groups. 
Loss of membership in moral communities can have severe ramifications. 
G. N. Appell makes chillingly clear the consequences of when moral language is 
used for that purpose, “By morally devaluing one’s competitor for resources 
and power, dehumanization permits guilt-free behavior of any sort that will 
obtain one’s goals, even if one’s competitor is destroyed in the process. In fact, 
such ethical discourse makes the attack on the competitor morally justifiable.”5 
                                                          
4 Appell, George N. “Talking Ethics: The Uses of Moral Rhetoric and the Function of Ethical 
Principles.” Social Problems 27.3 (1980): 352.  
 
5 Ibid., 355.  
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One need not look far for examples of this sort of use of moral language. 
President Trump’s descriptions of Mexican and Muslims both fit into this 
category, as does current conservative descriptions of the threat posed by 
trans-individuals, and discussion surrounding gay and black individuals. Even 
if the particular laws the language is used to support do not pass, the language 
itself serves to further alienate marginalized groups and justify future 
persecution.  This demonstrates that the misuse of moral language is a serious 
problem that must be addressed.  
Before developing the main arguments for this position, an intuitive 
objection will first be addressed. Some might object that it is implausible that 
stating accurate moral judgments is wrong. So long as the true statements are 
not directly or intentionally harmful, there is nothing wrong about expressing 
them. The objection concludes that even if some people are misusing moral 
rhetoric, only those guilty parties should be obligated to stop using it. While 
seemingly plausible at first glance, this objection is misguided. Paul W. Taylor 
provides a useful conceptual framework to understand why the truth of moral 
statements is distinct from the morality of uttering those statements. He notes 
that the evaluation of moral utterances includes “judging the moral rightness 
or wrongness of using certain moral expressions in certain circumstances for 
certain purposes.”6 If someone tells an old woman on her death bed that her 
son is morally repugnant, they may well be speaking the truth, but that does 
                                                          
6 Taylor, Paul W. “Moral Rhetoric, Moral Philosophy, and the Science of Morals.” The Journal of 
Philosophy 56.17 (1959): 692.  
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not mean they are acting morally when they tell her this. Examples like that 
and countless others lead to the conclusion that, “Whether a given moral 
judgment is true or false does not depend on whether it is morally right or 
wrong to pronounce it.”7 The objection is therefore shown to be misguided, 
because there is no overriding reason why morality cannot require individuals 
from abstaining from uttering accurate moral statements.  
Since a moral statement being true is insufficient to justify saying it, 
some other standard must be used. While initially proposed in the context of 
evaluating metaethical theories, Taylor provides a useful metric for how moral 
norms on the use of moral language should be evaluated, “Its goal is to become 
an instrument which can, if people want to use it, help them to find good 
reasons for moral judgments, to use moral language in the clearest and least 
misleading ways, and to understand exactly what it is to carry on moral 
deliberation or to settle a moral dispute.”8 If it can be demonstrated that 
ceasing to use moral language when discussing laws better meets those 
aforementioned goals, then it is clear that there are compelling moral reasons 
to do so.  
The duty to abstain from the use of moral language when discussing 
laws is due to how normative force manifests itself in language. In a common 
sense understanding of morality, one of its essential features is that it provides 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 694. 
8 Taylor, Paul W. “The Normative Function of Metaethics.” The Philosophical Review 67.1 
(1958): 31.  
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normative force that gives individuals reasons to act. The fact that x is moral is 
a reason to do x. The fact that y is immoral is a reason to refrain from doing y. 
Since morality includes this normative, reason-giving component, statements 
containing moral language provide reason to act, rather than merely stating 
facts. The statement the affordable care act is immoral, provides people with a 
reason to oppose that particular act. This reason is not overriding, if someone 
is skeptical of the claim or has an opposing viewpoint, it will not provide a 
sufficient reason to act. Even though moral language is capable of conveying 
the normative force of morality, that connection is not absolute. Language is 
imbued with normative force because of the association with legitimate moral 
judgements; it is this association and not the words themselves that provide 
the reasons to act.  
The association does not need to be perfect; every moral statement need 
not be true in order for moral language to continue to convey normative force. 
It is important to emphasize, that normative force is only conveyed by moral 
judgments that are perceived to be legitimate. If a moral statement is clearly 
false, it will not carry reasons to act. However, if moral statements are 
plausible, especially if spoken by authority figures, they will often be associated 
with legitimate moral judgments. Understanding how normative force is 
conveyed through moral language is essential to discovering how the misuse of 
moral language occurs and how it can be prevented.  
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The misuse of moral language can be conceived of as a sort of free rider 
problem. Moral language functions correctly because the majority of people 
using it do so in good faith and only invoke it in connection to accurate moral 
judgments. Those who misuse moral language take advantage of this fact. They 
invoke moral rhetoric so that their statements, which are empty of moral 
content or even antithetical to morality, will be imbued with normative force. 
Since the impact of laws are often unclear to the general public and there is a 
time delay between discussion of laws and implementation of them, free riders 
can take advantage of moral language without undermining faith in it 
altogether. However, the only reason why moral language can be misused in 
this way is because the free riders are piggybacking off other people’s legitimate 
uses of moral language. In the absence of legitimate uses of moral terms, or at 
least a refusal by a sizable portion of the population to use moral rhetoric, 
invocation of such terms no longer carries the same normative, reason-giving 
force.  
Flagrant uses of moral rhetoric will become visible for what they are; 
namely, an attempt to pass a law irrespective of the accuracy of the moral 
statements themselves. While initially said in the context of social sciences, 
Appell’s comment is even more applicable to politics and law, “Ethical 
discourse has been used as a means of disguising the real motives for social 
action by displacing attention from someone’s actual behavior. When ethical 
discourse is used to veil a political position, it can weaken the thrust for 
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greater ethical concern.”9 Without legitimate uses of simple moral language, 
ethical concern for that sort of language will erode and it will no longer carry 
the normative force it once did. Additionally, rather than being broadly 
accepted, simple moral language will likely be evaluated critically and with a 
good deal of suspicion. This establishes that there is a compelling moral reason 
to refrain from using moral language when discussing laws.  
Additionally, refraining from using simple moral language when 
discussing laws facilitates better moral discourse. A serious issue when 
discussing laws with moral ramifications is a refusal to engage substantively 
with the other side. One major reason for this is that moral rhetoric often 
frames disputes regarding the morality of laws as ultimate moral 
disagreements. Taylor notes, “An ultimate moral disagreement occurs when 
two people agree on all the facts of the case but disagree in their moral 
opinions.”10 While moral disagreements surrounding policies are rarely 
ultimate moral disagreements, the language used to discuss them implies 
otherwise. By using moral rhetoric, morality is seen to be little more than 
surface level intuitions or personal preferences, which means there is no 
reason to discuss conceptions of morality further. Moral language therefore has 
the tendency to present moral disagreements as irreconcilable. When 
individuals cease to use simple moral language, it becomes clear that there are 
underlying moral justifications behind positions. There are two substantial 
                                                          
9 Appell, Talking Ethics, 350.  
10 Taylor, The Normative Function of Metaethics, 23.  
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benefits associated with this change in moral discourse surrounding laws. 
First, it encourages conversation when previously there would only be debate, 
which means that individuals are more likely to be convinced to accept the 
more accurate position. Additionally, it makes clear that it is as important to 
discuss conceptions of morality as it is to discuss possible consequences of 
laws. This is essential, because without a clear notion of right or wrong it is 
impossible to evaluate laws. Not only does refraining from using simple moral 
language when discussing laws prevent misuse of moral language, it also 
facilitates better and more clear use overall.  
The most significant objection to the position of this paper is that it 
prevents moral discourse and disallows criticism of immoral features of laws. 
However, it is important to recognize that the principle being defended only 
applies to simple moral language. Simple moral language conveys moral 
positions without any sort of deeper justification or analysis. An example of 
this sort of language is murder is immoral. The same sentiment can be said in 
ways that do not fall under the category of simple moral language: murder is 
wrong because it denies individuals their right to life or murder is wrong because 
it reduces overall wellbeing. This example makes clear that refraining from 
using moral language does not mean refraining from expressing moral 
sentiments. When used legitimately, simple moral language is merely 
shorthand for deeper moral principles and positions. This means that any 
individuals who wish to express moral positions about laws are free to do so, 
because they can easily fall back upon the underlying moral principles that 
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make their positions true in the first place. Problems only arise for those who 
are using moral language to express positions that are devoid of moral content 
or reliant upon incorrect moral justifications.  
The position defended is particularly effective at solving the problem 
identified, because it disallows the instrumentalization of moral language for 
amoral or immoral ends. There are three courses of action available to former 
moral language free riders. The first option is to stop using moral language 
altogether. This is good because it means that moral norms are no longer being 
co-opted. Additionally, people “often experience ‘moral outrage’ at the 
suggestion that nonmoral considerations be weighed alongside moral ones,” 
which means that moral criticism of these laws or policies are likely to be 
successful in defeating them.11 The second option available is for former free 
riders to continue using simple moral language. However, since that type of 
moral language is no longer associated with legitimate moral judgments, it will 
cease to have any normative force. Therefore, it would merely be empty rhetoric 
that will not provide any reason for people to act. The final option available is 
to try to express one’s position in terms of underlying moral principles. 
Individuals who had been using empty moral rhetoric all along will not be able 
to access this option. The only people able to translate their simple moral 
language into deeper moral statements are those whose positions rely on, in 
the words of Jonathan Bennet, ‘bad morality.’12 Even in this case, it is better 
                                                          
11 Clifford and Jerit, How Words Do the Work of Politics, 661.  
12 Bennett, The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn, 123.  
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for individuals to express their moral sentiments in terms of underlying 
principles, rather than merely couching them through simple moral language.  
Bad moral positions lose their ability to influence individuals once they 
are stated explicitly. There are typically two different ways that these bad moral 
positions can be expressed through their underlying justifications. The first 
way is a legitimate moral justification that is reliant upon incorrect empirical 
facts. An example of this is the position of supporters of anti-trans bathroom 
legislation, such as those recently debated in Texas and North Carolina. The 
simple moral expression of the defense of these bills it that there is a moral 
imperative to implement them. The deeper justification is that these sorts of 
bills are needed to safeguard women and children.13 When expressed in this 
format, the moral status of these bills becomes an empirical question that can 
be easily refuted. The second way these bad moral positions can be expressed 
is through false or at times even repugnant justifications. An example of this 
sort of justification can be seen during discussion of California’s Proposition 6, 
also known as Brigg’s Initiative, which was debated during the late 1970s. The 
legislation would have banned all gay and lesbian individuals, and possibly 
even supporters of gay rights, from working in California’s public schools. The 
underlying justification for this position was that gays and lesbians are moral 
deviants who would corrupt children if they had any contact with them.14 
When stated in this fashion, moral criticisms can be brought against it and can 
                                                          
13 Agrawal, North Carolina Republicans Vow Showdown Over Trans Rights.  
14 Grigg, Amanda. “Republicans in North Carolina Strategically Tapped into a Long History of 
Anti-LGBTQ Rhetoric.” The Fair Jilt. http://thefairjilt.com/2016/03/24/nctrans/ (accessed 
March 3, 2017).  
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clearly demonstrate why it is not a valid moral position. When individuals 
refrain from using simple moral language when discussing laws, bad moral 
positions can no longer masquerade as something worth influencing policy 
decisions.  
Given how readily moral language can be instrumentalized for amoral or 
immoral ends and its ability to alienate disfavored groups, there are compelling 
moral reasons to try to stop or hinder such abuse of moral language. It has 
been demonstrated that moral language only has reason-giving force because 
of its association with legitimate moral judgments. If individuals refrain from 
using simple moral language when discussing laws, the invocation of such 
language will no longer exert influence on people. Those who previously 
misused moral language are left with three options, but none of the options 
allow them to effectively instrumentalize the normative force of morality. 
Finally, individuals who wish to express legitimate moral positions are still free 
to do so by expressing their underlying moral justifications. This ultimately 
facilitates better moral discourse and makes clear the actual moral 
ramifications of laws. While the benefits discussed in this paper will not be 
immediate, once a norm has been established the situation sketched out above 
should develop. Unlike typical collective action problems, nothing is lost by 
transitioning from simple moral language to content-laden language, which 
means the reasons to refrain from the use of moral language when discussing 
laws are overriding.  
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